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4.1  Introduction 
Japan’s current public medical insurance can be compared to an un- 
stable two-story building whose second floor is becoming heavier each day 
while its first floor is losing strength. There are three pillars in the first floor 
that support the weight of the whole building. The first of the three consists 
of insurance programs that cover the health care costs of employees and 
their dependents. These include health insurance managed by associations 
(HIMAs), most of which are firm-specific; health insurance managed by 
government (HIMG), which is the largest insurance program in Japan; and 
health insurance for government employees (HIGEs),  organized  sepa- 
rately for various national government agencies and for municipal govern- 
ment  employees.  These programs  provide  uniform  medical  insurance 
benefits but  collect different premiums  from  their  employees as fixed 
proportions of their wages or salaries. These premium rates are set indi- 
vidually for each program. Because they collect far more revenue than is 
necessary to pay for their own benefits, they provide the most important 
support for the health care costs of the elderly. 
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The second pillar consists of the group of national health insurance pro- 
grams (NHIs), consisting mainly of more than 3,200 municipal programs. 
They provide health insurance for self-employed workers, the retired, and 
others who are not covered by employees’ programs. They are financially 
very weak, and their premium revenues amount to only 60 percent of the 
benefits for these people. They receive generous subsidies from the national 
and local governments and do not contribute at all to pay for the health 
care costs of the elderly. 
The third pillar consists of all the subsidies from the national and mu- 
nicipal governments. Particularly important are those from the national 
government, which has been subsidizing half of the NHI’s benefits and half 
of the elderly’s health care charges levied on NHIs. The government also 
subsidizes 13 percent  of the expense of the benefits for the HIMG and 
some of the elderly’s health care charges. 
The second floor of our building consists of the health care insurance for 
the elderly, which provides medical care benefits to those over age seventy 
for very little cost.’ The insurance program for the elderly does not collect 
premiums on its own, and the benefits are paid by collecting charges from 
other primary public insurance programs. Thus, most of the health care 
costs of the elderly have been shifted to those in the first floor, most notably 
to the employee health insurance programs and the national government. 
Under the current system, 70 percent of the health care costs of the elderly 
(net of their small out-of-pocket costs) are charged to the insurance pro- 
grams in  the first floor, with each insurance program  contributing an 
amount in proportion to the number of its insured individuals and the av- 
erage health care cost of elderly in the system.2  Of the remaining 30 per- 
cent, the national government contributes 20 percent, and the local gov- 
ernments contribute 10 percent. Moreover, as we have already mentioned, 
the national government provides very substantial subsidies to HIMG and 
NHIs to help them pay their contributions to the health insurance for the 
elderly. 
This two-story structure has become very unstable, particularly in the 
last few years, for two reasons, one cyclical and the other structural. The 
first reason is the prolonged economic slump Japan has been experiencing 
for almost a decade now. It has had a large negative effect on the revenues 
of all the insurance programs in the first floor. The ones hit hardest by the 
slump are those of the employees; their wage rates and the size of the em- 
ployment have shown little, if any, growth. The second reason is structural: 
there has been a rapid increase in the number of individuals who are reach- 
1. To be exact, the scheme is for those seventy years of age and over and their families and 
those sixty-five  years of age and over who are bedridden. 
2. The actual computation of charges for individual insurance programs is slightly more 
complicated: it multiplies the amount by the ratio of the average health care cost of the elderly 
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ing age seventy and moving from the first floor to the second. With each 
person moving from the first floor to the second, a very large weight is 
added to the second floor. The government has tried to control the cost of 
health care for the elderly through various measures, but the effects seem 
to last for a relatively short period of time, and soon the medical costs of 
the elderly have started to increase again. 
Given the current two-story system, the bulk of the increase in health 
care costs of the elderly has been absorbed by  increases in employee in- 
surance premiums and budget deficits. Furthermore, employees’ out-of- 
pocket costs have been raised in steps, from 10 percent to 20 percent in 
1997, and from 20 percent to 30 percent in 2003 for employees, and from 
20 percent to 30 percent for their dependents. These changes have left em- 
ployees on par with individuals covered by  NHIs as far as the out-of- 
pocket costs are concerned, while making them pay almost twice as much 
on average in premiums. Similarly, the government has to deal with the 
swelling need for subsidies and the deepening of the budget deficit amidst 
a rapid decline in tax revenues. 
In the next twenty-five years, Japan’s population will age at a faster rate 
as the baby boomers move beyond age sixty-five. Under the current med- 
ical insurance system, the imbalance between benefits and costs will con- 
tinue to grow over time. With this imbalance, moral hazard and waste will 
grow in the health care sector, and inequity will intensify the social conflict 
among generations. These developments may lead to a fundamental re- 
form in Japan’s health insurance system. 
Our analyses in this paper address the two major weaknesses in our cur- 
rent health insurance system. The first is the insurance of the elderly, or the 
second floor of our insurance system. We will examine the consequences of 
the special treatment of the elderly, and we will assert it is difficult to con- 
tinue to support them. The second weakness is the NHI system. We should 
remind everyone that the health insurance for the elderly was born out of 
the huge deficits of the NHI programs and the national government in 
1984. Moreover, the national government has been subsidizing 50 percent 
of the expenses of the municipal NHI programs for over thirty years. This 
figure signifies that the NHI system has failed to function as an indepen- 
dent insurance system for the working generations. Thus, strengthening 
the financial base of the NHI as well as improving health insurance for the 
elderly may improve Japan’s medical insurance system. 
The remainder of this paper is constructed as follows. In section 4.2, we 
will show that the burden of medical expense is placed heavily on the em- 
ployees and the government. In section 4.3, we will explain a set of proce- 
dures for simulating the benefits and burdens of medical services, with the 
household as a unit of analysis. In section 4.4, we will verify the validity of 
our simulation procedures by  comparing the medical expenses and the 
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lished statistics and discuss the results of the simulation. Last, section 4.5 
will provide a conclusion and discuss the implications of our work. 
4.2  Japan’s Medical Care Financing 
4.2.1 
We will first examine the medical expenditures and financial resources 
of each type of insurance system using the national medical expenditures 
of fiscal year 1996. For the fiscal year, national medical expenditures were 
28.5 trillion yen, of which 1.3 trillion yen was paid directly by the govern- 
ment (as, for example, medical aid to low income families or by  other 
agents). This leaves 27.2 trillion yen of medical expenditures covered by 
public health insurance. The breakdown of this figure is as follows: 14.5 
trillion yen were paid as health insurance benefits for the nonelderly indi- 
viduals, 9.3 trillion yen as the health insurance benefits for the elderly, and 
only 3.4 trillion yen were paid by individuals (including the elderly) as their 
out-of-pocket costs. The government and the health insurance system al- 
together spent approximately 25 trillion yen. Premiums collected by the in- 
surance programs totaled 16 trillion yen, and subsidies from national and 
local government totaled 9.7 trillion yen. 
We use those figures to calculate the average medical expenditure and 
insurance premiums per household. First, we divide the total medical ex- 
pense by the number of households to obtain the average medical expendi- 
ture per household: 700,000 yen per year. As shown in table 4.1, the break- 
down of the source of payment is as follows: 101,000 yen from the public 
funds, 516,000 yen  from the insurance, and 83,000 yen from the house- 
hold members themselves. The expense paid by  the patients themselves 
refers to the amount actually paid at the medical institutions-this  has an 
immediate effect on the household budget. The expense paid from public 
funds and from insurance do not directly strain the household budget but 
eventually affects it in the form of premiums and taxes. Thus, it is impor- 
tant to illustrate the ways  in which the premiums and taxes burden the 
household. 
Table 4.1 shows the results of such analysis. The numbers on the left col- 
umn represent the amount spent on medical services per household. On 
the right are their estimated sources, categorized into three groups: premi- 
ums, taxes, and budget deficit. First, we obtain the amount of premiums 
paid per household by dividing the total sum of premiums by the number 
of households, which equals 392,000 yen. 
Next, we estimated how much of the general fiscal revenue from various 
taxes and public bonds has been allotted to finance medical expenses. The 
tax revenue allotted is estimated to be 9.1 trillion yen-this  figure is ob- 
tained by adding all the subsidies provided for the benefits of health insur- 
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Table 4.1  Sources and instruments of medical cost (NHCE) payments (in thousands 
of yen per household) 
Amount 
Sources 





























ance and the charges for the health care for the elderly, paid from the gen- 
eral tax revenue. The estimated figure was computed by the following pro- 
cedures: 
1. The general account revenue from taxes for fiscal year 1996 reached 
51.3 trillion yen, while revenue from public bonds was approximately 26 
trillion yen. The revenue from taxes will be deemed to have been 49.5 tril- 
lion yen (the revenue from the gasoline excise tax, which would be allotted 
to finance road maintenance, has been  subtracted), with the following 
breakdown: 19 trillion yen as income tax, 13.5  trillion yen as corporate tax, 
6 trillion yen as consumption tax, and 8 trillion yen from other taxes. 
2.  Because the sum of general revenues from taxes and public bonds was 
75.5  trillion  yen,  the  public  subsidies for  health  insurance  programs 
amount to approximately 12 percent of these revenues. 
3.  We multiply this percentage by the revenues from each tax and public 
bond per household and obtain 57,000 yen as income tax, 40,000 yen as 
corporate tax, 18,000 yen as consumption tax, and 32,000 yen for other 
taxes, and 77,000 yen for public bonds. Per household, the subsidies to the 
health insurance programs were financed with 147,000 yen in taxes and 
77,000 yen in bonds, respectively. 
Thus, roughly speaking, the 700,000 yen health care costs per household 
are borne as follows: 392,000 yen as premiums, 147,000  yen as taxes, 77,000 
yen as budget deficit and 83,000 yen as out-of-pocket costs. Or, in propor- 
tions, the health care cost is financed 56 percent by premiums, 21 percent 
by taxes, 11 percent by public bonds or budget deficit, and 12 percent from 88  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
Table 4.2  Sources and instruments of medical cost (NHCE) payments (in thousands 
of yen per household) 
Amount 
Sources 





























Notes: Figures exclude cost of dental care. Medical costs equal national medical expenditures 
minus the costs of dental care and pharmaceuticals dispensed to patients. 
out-of-pocket expenses. It must be noted that each year a very significant 
proportion of health care costs, almost equal to the out-of-pocket costs, is 
financed with public bonds to be paid by future generations. 
In this paper, we conduct various micro~imulation~  analyses of the bene- 
fits and burdens of health care costs, using medical costs, which equals na- 
tional medical expenditures minus the costs of dental care and pharma- 
ceuticals dispensed to patients. First, we  calculate the expenditures and 
burdens of medical costs borne by  each household as our reference case. 
According to the national medical expenditures for fiscal year 1996, med- 
ical costs accounted for SO percent of national medical expenditures. Thus, 
the sources of payments for medical costs were calculated by multiplying 
this percentage (SO percent) by the numbers listed in table 4.1. As shown in 
table 4.2, the results are 564,000 yen for medical cost, and the same amount 
was paid by each household. The breakdown of the cost is as follows: 67,000 
yen as out-of-pocket costs, 316,000 yen as premiums, and 118,000 yen as 
taxes. The tax burden can be further classified into income tax (46,000 yen), 
corporate tax (32,000 yen), and consumption tax (14,000 yen). 
4.2.2  Concentration of Burden on Employees and the National Treasury 
to Finance the Insurance Scheme for the Elderly 
The current insurance scheme for the elderly redistributes most of their 
medical costs to the government and employees. Take, as an example, the 
3. For example, Harding (1  996) is a collection paper of microsimulation. Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  89 
Table 4.3  Changes in instruments in aged households  by switching to Health 
Insurance for the Aged Health Insurance System in 1996 (in thousands 
of yen) 
HI MA and 
NHI  HIGE  HIMG  HIE  Changes 
Insurance premiums 
NHI 
HIMA and HIGE 
HIMG 
Government subsidies 
National government subsidy 










































Total  1,500  1,500  1,500  1,500  0 
Notes: HIMG = Health Insurance Managed by Government; HIMA and HIGE = Health 
Insurance Managed by Association and Health Insurance for Government Employees; NHI 
= National Health Insurance and other health insurances; HIE = Health Insurance for the 
Elderly. 
hypothetical case of a couple, both sixty-nine years old, who receive a pen- 
sion as their sole income. They are insured by  their municipal national 
health insurance program and spend 1,500,000  yen in health care costs per 
year. The cost represents the average health care costs for an elderly couple 
(hospitalization  and outpatient treatments) for fiscal  1995. The figures 
listed under the column “NHI”  in table 4.3 show who bears the burden and 
by how much. The couple paid 450,000 yen, or 30 percent of the expense, 
as out-of-pocket payments to providers. The national health insurance and 
the government split the rest of the expense, worth 1,050,000  yen, each pay- 
ing 525,000 yen. 
Now we compare this with the following year when the couple turns sev- 
enty, making them eligible for the health insurance for the elderly. We as- 
sume that their medical costs remain at 1,500,000 yen per year. Note that 
there was not a single, fixed out-of-pocket rate for the elderly. But accord- 
ing to the national medical expenditure for the fiscal 1996, the average 
medical expense paid  by  the elderly themselves was around 5 percent, 
which is the ratio we have used in the table. As shown in the column labeled 
“HIE” in table 4.3, 30 percent of the cost will be paid by public funds (20 
percent from national fund, 5 percent from prefectural fund, and 5 percent 
from municipal fund). This leaves 65 percent of the medical costs for the 
elderly couple, which will be charged to HIMA, HIMG, HIGE, and NHIs. 
Each insurance system contributes an amount equal to its proportion of 
the total number of participants (HIMA: 30 percent, HIMG and HIGE: 
35 percent, and NHI: 35 percent). The HIMG and NHI receive subsidies 
from the national government for their contributions, equaling 16.4 per- 
cent and 50 percent, respectively. 90  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
The key  factor that determines the changes in the burden of medical 
costs when the couple turns seventy is the type of insurance program they 
were enrolled in at age sixty-nine. Table 4.3 takes this into consideration 
and explores the cases in which the couple subscribes to NHI, HIMG, and 
HIMA and HIGE. We estimated the possibilities of the couple being sub- 
scribed to each insurance system at age sixty-nine as follows: 70 percent for 
the national health insurance, 20 percent for HIMG, and 10 percent for 
HIMA and HIGE. The figures in the last column illustrate the expected 
value of the changes. For every new couple becoming eligible for HIE 
1. out-of-pocket costs are reduced by 375,000 yen; 
2.  the costs to NHI are reduced by 200,000 yen; 
3.  the costs to the public sector are increased by 270,000 yen; and 
4.  the costs to HIMA and HIGE will be increased by 240,000 yen, while 
the costs to HIMA will be increased by 60,000 yen. 
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, as a result of the revision to the Health In- 
surance Law, starting April 2003 the elderly are responsible for 10 percent 
of their medical expense. Our table 4.4 shows the results of this revision. If 
an elderly couple were responsible for 10 percent of their own medical ex- 
penses, for every new couple becoming eligible for the elderly benefits 
1. the reduction in the out-of-pocket costs will be 300,000 yen; 
2.  the reduction in the national health insurance cost will be 210,000 
3.  the increase in the cost of the public sector will be 257,000 yen; and 
4.  the increase in the costs of HIMA and HIGE will be 210,000 yen and 
43,000 yen, respectively. 
These changes are  not insignificant, given that an average of over 1.3  mil- 
lion people have reached the age of seventy each year during the last few 
Yen; 




NHI  HIGE  HIMG  HIE  Changes 
Out-of-pocket  450  450  450  150  -3,000 
National government subsidy  525  0  137  502  1,070 
Other public subsidy  0  0  0  150  1,500 
NHI  525  0  0  158  -2,100 
HIMA and HIGE  0  1,050  0  315  2,100 
HIMG  0  0  914  226  430 
Total  1,500  1,500  1,500  1,500  0 
Note: See notes to table 4.3 for acronym explanations. The 2002 new health insurance law re- 
quired 10 percent out-of-pocket costs, raising the copayment rate to 10 percent for the aged 
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years. Prior to the reforms implemented in April 2003, this translated into 
an annual increase of 195 billion yen in medical expenses for the employee 
health insurance and an annual increase of  178 billion yen for the public 
sector. On the other hand, the cost imposed on national health insurance 
decreased by  130 billion yen every year, and the individual payments de- 
creased by  over 195 billion yen every year. After April 2003, medical ex- 
penses for the employee health insurance will increase annually by 164 bil- 
lion yen, and the public sector will have to bear an increase of 167 billion 
yen. The cost imposed on the national health insurance will decrease by 
137 billion yen every year, and the individual payments will decrease by  195 
billion yen every year. When people shift to the insurance scheme for the 
elderly, the burden shouldered by the employee health insurance and the 
public sector will decrease somewhat, and the decrease in individual pay- 
ments will be kept small. 
We must emphasize, moreover, that the shifts in financing burden are 
not temporary and will last for the rest of the elderly couple’s life. If we as- 
sume that an individual reaching age seventy has ten more years to live on 
average, the current insurance system will shift a burden close to 4 trillion 
yen each year from the national health insurance and the elderly them- 
selves to the employee health insurance and private sector. Even if the el- 
derly were to pay 10 percent of their medical costs, it makes little difference. 
Given that the aging of the population will continue at least for another 
twenty years, the size of this transfer will easily double, amplifying the ad- 
verse effects on individuals’ incentive to work and companies’ incentive to 
hire. 
There are grave problems in the current health insurance system. One is 
the fact that so much of the burden is shifted to the employee health insur- 
ance and the national treasury. Another is the fact that the percentage of 
individual payments drops dramatically after one turns age seventy. Gen- 
erally speaking, Japanese health care professionals are very critical of any 
attempt to increase out-of-pocket costs. They are especially opposed to 
raising those of the elderly, fearing it would prevent poor elderly from re- 
ceiving necessary medical services. The issue, however, is whether anyone 
who reaches age seventy should be exempt from paying out-of-pocket 
costs. Or why should we insist on making someone who is poor and very 
sick pay 30 percent of his or her medical costs because he or she is young? 
Younger individuals would  also be discouraged from receiving needed 
medical care. The authors doubt that age alone is a clear guide for solving 
these issues. It has been shown that the increase in the number of elderly 
aged seventy years and older increases the burden on employees and the 
national treasury. In other words, the current insurance scheme may stymie 
the fair allotment of the burden between the elderly generations and the 
working generations. If we reform the insurance scheme, to what extent 
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of medical expenses per household? We used the following simulation to 
address this question. 
4.3  Overview of the Microsimulation  Model 
In analyzing health care financing issues, it is not sufficient to have ac- 
curate information on total health care costs. A good framework for ana- 
lyzing these issues should include information on the joint distributions of 
health care costs and such key  socioeconomic indicators as age, income, 
and consumption. Ideally, such information should come directly from in- 
dividual households in the real world, but because such a perfect house- 
hold data set is not yet available for Japan, we  have decided to construct 
our own microsimulation model of health care costs. This model consists 
of a large number of hypothetical households randomly created according 
to the known marginal distributions of key  socioeconomic variables, to- 
gether with a number of rules regarding their health care service demand 
functions. The model provides information on the changes in the costs and 
benefits of health as the parameters of the health care financing system are 
changed. Health care utilization by individual households can then be ag- 
gregated by household types. 
First, we  have to obtain data on the benefits and costs of medical ser- 
vices at individual household levels. For this purpose, the best public data 
set available for Japan is the Comprehensive Survey of the Living Condi- 
tions of  People on Health and Welfare (Comprehensive Survey on Health 
and Welfare [CSHW]; Ministry of Health and Welfare 1997a). Extensive 
information has been collected in this survey regarding the socioeconomic 
characteristics of household members. The survey also gathers informa- 
tion on illnesses, symptoms, and treatments among household members. 
For our purposes, however, there are several serious shortcomings in this 
survey: 
1. The survey respondents tend to underreport the use of medical re- 
2. The survey lacks annual medical expense data. 
3.  The aggregate totals for socioeconomic variables using the specified 
scales differ substantially from census data, system of national accounts 
(SNA) statistics, and social insurance statistics, as the surveyed households 
have not been randomly selected. 
Details on how we  addressed the preceding issues appear in the appendix. 
Before moving on to the analyses of health care financing reforms, we 
will examine the quality of the information generated by our microsimula- 
tion model. We  compare them to those of the national medical expendi- 
tures of 1996,  using inpatient medical expenses, inpatient medical expenses 
by disease group, outpatient medical expenses, and total medical expenses. 
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4.3.1  Inpatient Medical Expenses 
As shown in table 4.5, according to our simulation the inpatient ex- 
penses in fiscal year 1996 are 10.2 trillion yen. Actual total medical ex- 
penses for fiscal 1996 were estimated to be 9.9 trillion yen. Thus, the error 
is plus 3 percent, which can be considered reasonably accurate. Turning to 
total medical costs by age and disease for patients over the age of sixty-five, 
who account for almost half of the inpatient expense, our simulation yields 
4.9 trillion yen, which is nearly the same as the figure in the national med- 
ical expenditure (5.0 trillion yen). However, some of the results of other 
groups show some inconsistencies; for example, our results for the patients 
between the ages of zero and fourteen, and the patients between the ages of 
forty-five and sixty-four are, respectively, 20 percent and 15 percent greater 
than the actual expenses. 
Table 4.5  Simulation estimates and estimates according to national health care 
expenditure (NHCE) for inpatient medical costs (in billions of yen) 
Our 
simulation 





65 and over 
Disease 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 
Neoplasms 
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 
Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases 
Mental disorders 
Diseases of the nervous system 
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process 
Diseases of the circulatory system 
Diseases of the respiratory system 
Diseases of the digestive system 
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 
Diseases of the genitourinary system 
Complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and puerperism 
Congenital anomalies 
Symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions 
















































Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998), Estimates of  National Medical Care Expendi- 
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4.3.2  Inpatient Medical Expenses by Disease Groups 
In most disease groups, our simulated costs for inpatient care are rea- 
sonably accurate with moderate errors. For example, our estimate for cir- 
culatory diseases, the group that accounts for the largest share of spending, 
is 10 percent greater than the national medical expenditure figure. Our es- 
timate for neoplasms is similarly overstated. Those two groups alone ac- 
count for 40 percent of our national inpatient care costs. On the other 
hand, we substantially overestimate spending for the pregnancy group and 
for the eye disease group. Conversely, we have underestimated spending by 
15 percent and 10 percent for the musculoskeletal and digestive diseases, 
respectively. 
4.3.3  Outpatient Medical Expenses 
Table 4.6 compares our simulation results for outpatient medical costs 
with the actual costs. According to our simulation, the total outpatient 
cost amounts to 12.0 trillion yen, which is almost equal to the actual value. 
Among the age classes, there is underestimation in the groups between the 
ages of zero and fourteen and between the ages of fifteen and forty-four, 
but there is  an overestimation among those sixty-five years and older. 
While we do not find significant errors in most major diseases, note that we 
overestimate spending by 30 percent for musculoskeletal diseases and un- 
derestimate spending by 40 percent for urino-genital diseases. 
4.3.4  Total Medical Expenses 
Table 4.7 compares the actual total medical costs and our simulation re- 
sults by age group. Actual medical costs equal 21.9 trillion yen, while our 
simulation figures total 22.2 trillion yen (only a 1 percent difference). By 
age group, the costs for those between zero and fourteen and those between 
fourteen and forty-four are underestimated, while the costs for those forty- 
five years old and older are overestimated. In percentage terms, the mag- 
nitude of the error is minus 10 percent for the younger generations, but 
note that their medical costs account for only 25 percent of the total. In 
contrast, for older patients, who consume around 75 percent of the total, 
the magnitude of the error is just a few percentage points. We conclude that 
our simulated spending is relatively accurate. 
4.4  Simulation Results under Different Scenarios 
In this section, we compare the simulation results for a number of sce- 
narios designed to capture the effects (direction and the magnitude) of al- 
ternative policies. One alternative we  consider is the combination  of in- 
creased out-of-pocket costs and an additional consumption tax to finance 
all public health care costs. For the price elasticity of medical services, we 
consider only the demand side and set it at -0.3 for inpatient care and at Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  95 
Table 4.6  Simulation estimates and estimates according to national health care 
expenditure (NHCE) for outpatient medical costs (in billions of yen) 
Our 
simulation 






65 and over 
Disease 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 
Neoplasms 
Diseases of the blood and blood-forming organs 
Endocrine, nutritional, and metabolic diseases 
Mental disorders 
Diseases of the nervous system 
Diseases of the eye and adnexa 
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process 
Diseases of the circulatory system 
Diseases of the respiratory system 
Diseases of the digestive system 
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue 
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 
Diseases of the genitourinary system 
Complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and puerperium 
Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period 
Congenital anomalies 
Symptoms, signs, and ill-defined conditions 
Injury and poisoning 
Medical expenditures for outpatients 
11,953  1  1,945 
1,886  2,201 
3,158  3,947 
5,581  4,840 
129  958 
413  314 
881  790 
41  71 
980  945 
291  291 
265  194 
515  565 
116  152 
2,664  2,626 
1,302  1,326 
1,149  1,199 
350  312 
1,544  1,211 
647  1,063 
30  58 
1  5 
15  16 
153  115 
529  532 
11,953  11,916 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (1  998), Estimates of National Medical Care Expendi- 
ture, 1996. 
-0.15 for outpatient care (except in Scenario 5 as described in the follow- 
ing). For convenience, we  assume zero income elasticity of  demand for 
health care. 
The details of the five scenarios are as follows: 
Scenario 1: Maintain the current health insurance system (premiums and 
out-of-pocket costs) as of fiscal 1996. 
Scenario 2: Maintain out-of-pocket costs as of fiscal year 1996, but impose 
10 percent out-of-pocket costs for the elderly. The source of revenue will 
remain the same as of fiscal year 1996. The price elasticity of health care 
demand with respect to out-of-pocket costs will be set at -0.3  for inpa- 
tient care and -0.15 for outpatient care. 96  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
Table 4.7  Simulation estimates and estimates by national health care expenditure 
(NHCE) for medical costs (in billions of yen) 
















Scenario 3: Maintain out-of-pocket costs as of fiscal 1996, but impose 10 
percent out-of-pocket costs for the elderly. To pay for all the health care 
costs, an additional consumption tax set at 9 percent will be imposed. 
The price elasticity of health care demand with respect to out-of-pocket 
costs will be set at -0.3 for inpatient care and -0.15  for outpatient care. 
Scenario 4: Out-of-pocket costs will be set at 20 percent for all patients, and 
an additional consumption tax set at 8 percent will be imposed. The 
price elasticity of  health care demand with respect to out-of-pocket 
costs will be set at -0.3 for inpatient care and -0.15  for outpatient care. 
Scenario 5: Out-of-pocket costs will be set at 20 percent for all patients, and 
an additional consumption tax set at 8 percent will be imposed. The elas- 
ticity will be set at -0.6  for inpatient care and -0.3 for outpatient care. 
4.4.1 
On one hand, we have Scenario 1, which was the status quo as of 1996, 
the year on which our microsimulation model is based. Scenario 2 is a sim- 
plified version of the new status quo since October 2002.4  On the other, we 
have Scenarios 4 and 5 with uniform 20 percent out-of-pocket costs and an 
additional 8 percent consumption tax to finance health insurance benefits. 
Compared with the preferential out-of-pocket rates offered to the elderly 
and the weak financing mechanism in Scenarios 1 and 2, Scenario 4 offers 
an alternative that is both simple and stable. For this reason, we  are par- 
ticularly interested in finding out what changes would be involved in the 
transition to Scenario 4.5 
The out-of-pocket costs in Scenarios 2 and 3 may be considered transi- 
tional steps between the 1996 system and a uniform rate of 20 percent. The 
Characteristics and Results of Each Scenario 
4. To be precise, since April 2003 an elderly couple with more than 1.24 million yen in tax- 
able income or 6.37 million yen in pretax income is responsible for 20 percent of their health 
care costs. 
5. We will emphasize the results of Scenario 4, but this should not be taken as support for 
the unification of all public medical insurances, a position strongly advocated by the Japan 
Medical Association. Our version of Scenario 4 is a system in which public insurance pro- 
grams, sharing consumption-tax revenue with appropriate risk adjustments, compete to at- 
tract individuals by offering superior benefits. Unification of the out-of-pocket costs and the 
source of revenues would, we believe, be a first step to such a quasi-market mechanism. Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  97 
rate was increased to 10 percent for the elderly in October 2002, but the rate 
for others remained the same at 20 percent. Moreover, because the out-of- 
pocket rates are the same in Scenario 2 and 3, the expected medical ex- 
penses for each household will be the same6  and hence the differences be- 
tween the two scenarios are solely on the revenue side. 
The financing mechanism in Scenario 2 remains the same as in Scenario 
1, so the difference between the two is due to the out-of-pocket rates for the 
elderly. A higher out-of-pocket rate in Scenario 2 will reduce the medical 
costs of the elderly, which will reduce the required contributions of each 
insurance program and lessen the burden on the government. This will re- 
duce the financial burden for each household in Scenario 2. Scenario 3 is 
the same as Scenario 2, but with a consumption tax as the source of rev- 
enue. 
In Scenarios 4 and 5, the out-of-pocket costs are set at 20 percent, and 
all health insurance benefits are funded by an additional consumption tax 
of 8 percent. In Scenario 5, however, individuals are assumed to be twice 
as responsive to the increased out-of-pocket costs as in Scenario 4, which 
will result in a fiscal surplus to be refunded to households. Setting the elas- 
ticity of inpatient care with respect to out-of-pocket costs at -0.3  means 
that as the cost increases by 1 percent, hospitalizations will decrease by 0.3 
percent, resulting in a 0.3 percent decrease in inpatient medical costs. Set- 
ting the elasticity of outpatient care with respect to out-of-pocket cost at 
-0.15  means that as the rate increases by  1 percent, the outpatient visita- 
tion rate will decrease by 0.15 percent, resulting in a decrease in the num- 
ber of outpatients and their medical costs. 
4.4.2  Simulation Results 
In this section, for each scenario we show total expenditures and expen- 
ditures aggregated by household age groups and by insurance programs. 
To calculate the total individual burden, we have to consider the govern- 
ment subsidy and the surplus or deficit of the medical insurance programs 
as well. All our simulations produced surpluses in every insurance program 
(see table 4.Q7  and, hence, we estimated the household burden assuming 
that the surpluses would be returned to the households in equal amounts. 
Household Payments by the Age qf  Householders 
Our table 4.9 shows the mean costs of medical care consumed and the 
payments for medical care per household, by age group of the household 
head. To compare the scenarios, figure 4.1 shows mean payments as a frac- 
tion of mean medical costs by age group of the household head (100 per- 
6. Recall that the income elasticity of demand for medical care is assumed to be zero. 
7. In the case of Scenarios 2 through 5, there is a surplus ranging from 1.2 trillion to 2 tril- 
lion yen (table 4.8). In other words, financial resources are sufficient in each of our scenarios. 98  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
Table 4.8  Medical costs and burden simulated by scenario and by age of head of 
household (in billions of yen) 
15-39  40-64  65 and over  Total 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8Yn) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
A. Scenario I 
2,144  11,109 
324  1,114 
2,561  7,885 
1,453  5,218 
4,345  14,277 
B. Scenario 2 
2,042  10,367 
344  1,311 
2,561  7,885 
1,097  3,587 
4,008  12,842 
C. Scenurio 3 
2,042  10,367 
344  1,371 
3,953  11,805 
-284  -1,351 
4,012  11,825 
D.  Scenario 4 
1,993  10,354 
399  2,071 
3,546  10,591 
3,772  1 1,842 
1,934  10,112 
381  2,022 
3,546  10,591 
-254  -1,208 
3,619  1  1,405 
-1  72  -820 



















































cent would indicate that the household financial burden equals the cost of 
medical care consumed). 
Under Scenario 1, or the 1996 system, the households headed by indi- 
viduals age sixty-five or older bear only 39.8 percent of their medical costs 
on the average. In contrast, the households whose heads are in the prime of 
life and support their children (ages forty to sixty-four) bear about 128.5 
percent of their medical costs on the average, and the households whose 
heads are between fifteen and thirty-nine bear over 200 percent of their 
medical costs. 
Under Scenarios 4 and 5 (8 percent consumption tax, 20 percent indi- 
vidual payment rate), the households headed by individuals sixty-five and 
older will bear slightly over 60 percent of their mean medical costs. On the Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  99 
Table 4.9  The means for medical costs and burden simulated by scenario (per 
household) and by age of head of household (in thousands of yen) 
15-39  40-64  65 and over  Total 
Medical costs  , 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 











3  64 










-1  6 
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439 
other hand, the burden on households headed by individuals between forty 
and sixty-four will be reduced to less than 11  5 percent. Households with 
heads between the ages of fifteen and thirty-nine will bear around 190 per- 
cent of their medical costs, slightly lower than in Scenario 1. Under Sce- 
nario 3, the households with heads sixty-five  or older will bear 57.2 percent 
of their costs, a little bit lower than Scenario 4, but considerably higher 
than the current rate. 
Analysis of  Individual Payment Per Household 
by the Age of the Householder 
We now examine the components of the total payments for medical care. 
Namely, in Scenarios 1 and 2,  the payments consist of out-of-pocket costs, 100  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
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Fig. 4.1 
household head (percentage) 
The ratios of medical burden to cost per household by age class for 
insurance premiums and the imputed taxes, while in scenarios 3 through 5, 
the insurance premiums and imputed taxes and deficits are replaced by the 
consumption taxes. To facilitate comparison between these two groups of 
scenarios, the sum of all payments other than out-of-pocket costs (i.e., the 
premiums, imputed tax and surplus payments, and consumption tax)*  will 
be referred to simply as “premiums and taxes.” 
Now we examine how the out-of-pocket costs and premiums and taxes 
shift as we move away from Scenario 1. Figure 4.2 illustrates two particu- 
larly interesting comparisons, namely Scenarios 3 and 4, relative to Sce- 
nario  1. The results are shown separately by age group of the household 
head. 
If Scenario 4 is put into effect, the total payments of households headed 
by individuals age fifteen to thirty-nine and individuals forty to sixty-four, 
will decrease by  13 percent and 17 percent, respectively. Note that out-of- 
pocket costs contribute +  1.7 percent and +6.7 percent, respectively, but 
premiums and taxes contribute -14.9  percent and -23.8 percent, respec- 
tively. We observe similar results for Scenario 3. 
On the other hand, households headed by individuals sixty-five or older 
experience a 42 percent increase in total payments in Scenario 4. Specifi- 
cally, out-of-pocket costs contribute +  31 percent, and premiums and taxes 
contribute +  I1 percent. Thus, three-quarters of the change are due to the 
8. The “deficit” and “surplus transfer” items refer to the average value of the deficit or the 
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Fig. 4.2  Household medical burden changes by shifting Scenario 1 to other 
scenarios (by age class for household head) 
increase in the out-of-pocket costs. In case of Scenario 3, the total pay- 
ments will increase by 29 percent, with the out-of-pocket costs accounting 
for +  10 percent, and premiums and taxes accounting for +  19 percent. Be- 
cause the out-of-pocket rate for Scenario 3 is only one-half of Scenario 4, 
the medical costs of the elderly will be larger, resulting in a higher con- 
sumption tax rate. Particularly for the elderly, if we lower the out-of-pocket 
costs, we should expect premiums and taxes to move in the opposite direc- 
tion. 
Comparing the Contributions  across Insurance Types 
Table 4.10 illustrates mean  medical costs and financial burdens per 
household by type of insurance. We note that the insurance scheme for the 
elderly is not a primary medical insurance, but is more a reinsurance. As 
primary insurance programs in 1996, HIMA insured 940,000 elderly indi- 
viduals, HIMG insured just over 2 million, and NHIs insured nearly 9 mil- 
lion. 
Mean payments as a fraction of mean medical costs are shown in figure 
4.3 for each type of insurance and for each scenario. Households insured 
by national health insurance programs only contribute around 60 percent 
of their total medical costs under the 1996 health insurance system. House- 
holds insured by HIMA and HIGE, on the other hand, contribute over 170 
percent of their own medical costs. For households insured by  HIMG, 
their contribution  amounts to just under  115 percent of  their medical 
costs. Scenario 2 is similar in these respects to Scenario 1. 
In the case of Scenarios 3 through 5, in which consumption tax is used 102  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
Table 4.10  The means for medical costs and burden simulated by scenario (per 
household and in thousands of yen) 
NHI  HIMG  HIMAandHIGE  Mean 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (8%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
A. Scenario 1 
581  439 
53  38 
112  256 
126  210 
351  504 
B. Scenario 2 
534  412 
58  62 
112  256 
02  155 
322  413 
C. Scenario 3 
534  412 
58  62 
396  438 
-21  -44 
421  456 
D. Scenario 4 
548  408 
110  82 
356  393 
-16  -21 
449  448 
E. Scenario 5 
525  399 
105  80 
3.56  393 
-24  -39 



















































Note: See table 4.3 for acronym explanations. 
to finance health insurance benefits, households with national health in- 
surance contribute around 80 percent, households with HIMA or HIGE 
contribute around 130 percent, and households with HIMG contribute 
around 110 percent. Clearly, even when the consumption tax is used to fi- 
nance the medical insurance benefits, the total contribution varies widely 
across different types of insurances. Because the average health care costs 
of the elderly are several times of those of the rest of the population, and 
because they contribute substantially less than their full costs, the insur- 
ance programs with larger-than-average percentages of the elderly, such as 
NHIs, will  have contribution-to-cost ratios of less than  1. These ratios, 
however, will move in the same direction as the contribution-to-cost ratio Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  103 
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Fig. 4.3  The ratios of medical burden to cost per household by branch of health 
insurance (percentage) 
of the elderly: for example, a consumption tax raises the contribution-to- 
cost ratio of the elderly and NHIs as well. 
4.4.3  Implications for Different Types of Insurance and Age Groups 
Table 4.11  shows mean contributions as a fraction of  mean medical 
costs, by  type of insurance and age group of the head of household, for 
each scenario. For a given age group, the fractions under  Scenarios 3 
through 5 are far less dispersed than under Scenario 1. This implies that 
these systems are more horizontally equitable than the 1996 system. Com- 
paring the contribution-to-cost ratios within the given insurance types 
(i.e., vertically), or across different insurance types (i.e., diagonally), we 
observe that the ratios narrow considerably under any of these three sce- 
narios. This implies that these systems are far more equitable between the 
generations than the 1996 system. 
Now we  examine how the total contribution-to-cost ratio changes for 
households whose heads are between the ages of fifteen and thirty-nine un- 
der each scenario. It should be noted that even under the 1996 system, the 
younger households with NHIs contribute  125.0 percent of  their total 
costs. Although this figure is lower than those of HIMG households (191  .O 
percent) or of HIMA or HIGE households (252.7 percent), the ratios of 
other age-groups in NHIs are below 100 percent. In Scenario 2, the figures 
are similar to those in Scenario 1. 
If all the health insurance benefits are financed by a consumption tax, 
as in Scenario 4, younger households in NHIs contribute 197.6 percent, 104  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
Table 4.11  The means for ratios of medical burden to cost simulated by scenario (per 
househqld) and by age and branch of insurance for the head of household 
~  ~~ 
NHI  HIMG  HIMA and HIGE  Mean 
15-39 
40-64 







































































































Note: See table 4.3 for acronym explanations. 
households in HIMG contribute 18  1.9 percent, and households in HIMA 
or HIGE contribute 189.7 percent of their own health care costs. In other 
words, households with NHIs contribute greater proportions than house- 
holds with employee health insurance, primarily due to their lower medical 
costs. Similar results were obtained in Scenarios 3 and 5. 
For households with heads age forty to sixty-four, in Scenario  1 the 
contribution-to-cost ratios are as follows: 90.9 percent for those in NHIs, 
119.7 percent for those in HIMG, and 173.7  percent for those in HIMA or 
HIGE. If all the insurance benefits are financed by consumption tax, as in 
the case of Scenario 4, the contribution-to-cost ratios are 104.9  percent for 
households in NHIs, 109.8 percent for HIMG households, and 127.6 per- 
cent for HIMA or HIGE households. Thus, by switching  to a consumption 
tax, the ratio increases for NHI and HIMG households  and drops for 
HIMA/HIGE households, bringing the ratios to converge around 1 10 per- 
cent. In other words, a switch to a consumption tax is a reform that brings Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  105 
the burdens of households who are raising families more or less in line with 
their medical costs. 
Last, in the  1996 system, for households with heads age sixty-five or 
older, the contribution-to-cost ratios show substantial variations; they are 
37.3 percent for national health insurance, 52.8 percent for HIMG, and 
48.7 percent for HIMA or HIGE, respectively. The low ratio for NHIs re- 
flects the preferential treatments in out-of-pocket costs, premium assess- 
ment, and income tax. The higher rates for HIMG and HIMA or HIGE 
probably reflect the insurance premium payments by the heads who are 
still employed by firms. 
It must be noted that by  switching to a consumption tax to finance 
health insurance benefits, the contributions of this older age group will be 
increased for all types of insurance. For example, in Scenario 4 such house- 
holds would be responsible for around 61 percent of their medical costs, re- 
gardless of insurance type. The disincentive for the working elderly can be 
solved by switching to a consumption tax. The fact that the elderly would 
be responsible for 60 percent of their costs needs to be scrutinized more 
closely, but there are clear advantages to the use of a consumption tax to fi- 
nance benefits. 
4.4.4  Income Distribution and Contribution-to-Medical-Costs Ratios 
Table 4.12 is the average figures of medical costs and total contributions 
of households by  quartiles of household income. The bottom figures in 
each scenario stand for the contribution-to-medical-costs ratios. In our 
baseline Scenario 1, the bottom income quartile households pay 54.2 per- 
cent of their health care costs, while the top income quartile households 
pay 131.8  percent. In each of our scenarios, we observe a positive relation- 
ship between the household income and contribution-to-medical-costs ra- 
tios, and, in each of our scenarios, the top income quartile pays more than 
100 percent. However, as we move from Scenario 3 to 5,  the bottom quar- 
tile’s contribution-to-medical-costs  ratios increase from 7 1.6 percent to 
82.1 percent. Particularly in Scenarios 4 and 5, there is a tendency for the 
contribution-to-medical-costs ratios to move toward  1, regardless of in- 
come quartiles, which reflects the fact that, proportionally speaking, con- 
sumption tax tends to take more bite out of  the income of the poorer 
households. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the rich are paying more than they consume 
under the present system and under any reform plan. Technically, this re- 
sult is a trivial one because our simulation started from our (estimated) 
household demand functions for medical services with zero income elas- 
ticity. We should note, however, more recent studies by other authors more 
or less confirmed that income elasticity for medical services is either very 
small or even negative. This result seems to contradict the widely held be- 
lief that health care services are luxury goods. An economically sensible 106  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto  Kawamura 
Table 4.12  The means of medical burden to cost simulated by scenario (per household) and by 
percentile for household income (in thousands of yen) 
25th  50th 
Below  through  through  75th 
25th  50th  75th  percentile 
percentile  percentile  percentile  and above  Total 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
Contribution to medical costs 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of premium 
Tax incidence and public subsidy 
Sum of household burden 
contribution to medical costs 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Contribution to medical costs 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Contribution to medical costs 
Medical costs 
Out-of-pocket costs 
Burden of consumption tax (9%) 
Health insurance surplus 
Sum of household burden 
Contribution to medical costs 
A.  Scenario 1 
449  468 
32  44 
71  190 
141  167 
243  400 
54.20  85.49 
B. Scenario 2 
408  430 
40  57 
144  237 
101  118 
286  412 
70.08  95.67 
C. Scenario 3 
408  430 
46  53 
278  390 
-32  -39 
292  404 
71.68  93.91 
D. Scenario 4 
419  436 
79  84 
249  350 
-1  9  -23 
309  410 
73.78  94.04 
E. Scenario 5 
40 1  42  1 
59  85 
299  363 
-28  -3 5 
329  413 
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answer to this apparent contradiction is that under the Japanese public 
health  insurance  schemes, by  and large, medical services are rationed 
goods, whose quantities or qualities consumers have relatively little to say. 
There are some clear exceptions; first, some categories of  illnesses are 
not covered by public health insurance, e.g., pregnancies, car accidents, or Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  107 
injuries incurred in fights. They constitute only a few percentage points of 
the national medical services market. Second, there is potentially a very 
large market for services not approved by  public health insurance pro- 
grams, including many high-tech medical services or unapproved drugs. 
Up to now, providers have been obligated to separate the medical services 
covered by  the public health insurance and the medical services not cov- 
ered by the public health insurance, and mixed billing have been strictly 
prohibited. 
4.5  Conclusion 
In this paper, we  showed that in the 1996 health insurance system an im- 
balance of the benefits and burden of medical services was created across 
generations and that the imbalance was growing rapidly due to the aging 
of the population. The working generations are forced to bear an increas- 
ingly large load while their benefits are reduced. The view that the current 
medical insurance system is not sustainable in the long run is spreading 
very fast and eroding the credibility of the government, which has been 
stressing the system’s equality. The Health Insurance Reform in April of 
2003, which retained most of the privileges of the elderly, seems to have 
been another stopgap measure that failed to restore public confidence. 
In order to defuse an approaching crisis, we  consider a system that is 
simple, fair, and self-sustaining at the same time. We  have constructed a 
microsimulation model as a tool for judging the properties of  a given 
health insurance system. This simulation model consists of a large number 
of  individual  households  that collectively represent  the  economic and 
health statistics of our economy. We conducted several simulations to ex- 
plore policy alternatives and analyzed the resulting incidence of medical 
costs and benefits. 
The purpose of this simulation was to find a scenario in which an em- 
ployee in his or her working prime (i.e., a household head age forty to sixty- 
four), who may be supporting children, would have a financial burden ap- 
propriate to the benefits he or she receives. 
One scenario  that would  satisfy these two conditions is  Scenario 3, 
which relies on a consumption tax as the sole financial tool to pay for in- 
surance benefits, raises to 10 percent the out-of-pocket costs for the elderly, 
and maintains the current out-of-pocket costs for other consumers. An- 
other is Scenario 4, which uses the consumption tax as the sole financial 
tool to pay for the insurance benefits and raises everyone’s out-of-pocket 
costs to 20 percent. These scenarios call for 8 percent (Scenario 3) or 9 per- 
cent (Scenario 4) consumption tax rates. 
These two scenarios would make the elderly responsible for far more 
than the 40 percent they are paying for now, but not for more than 60 per- 
cent (Scenario 4). In Scenarios 3 and 4, the contribution-to-costs ratios are 108  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
far less dispersed across different types of insurance for a given age group, 
compared to the current system (Scenario 1 or 2). In terms of horizontal 
equity, the overall allocation of health insurance costs and benefits are far 
better in Scenarios 3 and 4. The current system consists of very different 
premiums, subsidies, and reinsurances. By replacing it with the consump- 
tion tax to finance health insurance benefits, it is also possible to reduce the 
huge  disparity  in  the  contribution-to-costs  ratios  across different age 
groups and improve the vertical equity of the medical insurance system. 
Last, we would like to address the limitations of our analysis. First of all, 
the microsimulation model is a static model. It would have been better if we 
could have explicitly incorporated health capital as a determinant of med- 
ical costs and income. We also do  not take savings into consideration. If we 
introduced savings into our model, it would be  possible to examine the 
effects of increasing the burden  on the elderly that would  result  from 
changes in the medical insurance system (changes in out-of-pocket costs of 
the patients, the use of consumption tax, etc.) on household assets. We also 
did not consider population dynamics in our model, fixing the population 
structure to year 1995. Thus, our simulation results depend on the given 
year’s population structure. On the other hand, we did take into account 
the annual budget deficit of the national government as one component of 
household financial burden, but not the enormous stock of public bonds. 
We should also remind our readers that we have assumed zero income elas- 
ticity in the demand for medical services in our model. It is not difficult to 
incorporate this element, but we decided against doing so to simplify com- 
parisons across scenarios. 
Appendix 
Calibration  of our Microsimulation  Model 
Creation of Standard Households and the Fixing of Scaling Factor 
First, we created 100,000 probabilistic virtual households based on the 
CSHW data on the distribution of household and individual attributes. 
These virtual households will hereafter be called standard households. The 
standard households are categorized in the same manner as the census us- 
ing the age of householder, sex, marital status, the number of members, and 
so on. Next, we  fixed the weights for the standard households so that the 
number of each type of household in each prefecture would conform to 
the number in the most recent census. We then adjusted the weights so that 
the aggregate employment income, consumption expenditure, and social 
insurance premiums of all the households would be reasonably close to Removing the Instability in the Japanese Health Insurance System  109 
the SNA statistics. Finally, we adjusted to the weights again so that the dis- 
tribution  of employment income from the survey would be reasonably 
close to the known distribution of household monthly compensation. 
Estimating The Number of Patients 
Next, we constructed a stochastic model that can be used to reproduce 
the medical utilization patterns recorded in the Patient Survey 1996 (Min- 
istry of Health and Welfare  1997b). We  use the Patient Survey 1996- 
rather than the CSHW-because  it is the most extensive and most accu- 
rate survey on the utilization of medical institutions by individual patients. 
The utilization information provided in the CSHW is plagued by  serious 
downward bias. Thus, we  assigned various illnesses to members of the 
standard households randomly, using the statistics on  major illnesses in sex 
and age groups of Patient Survey 1996. The place of treatment, nature of 
treatment, and the length of the treatment time are determined accord- 
ingly. 
Estimating the Number of Outpatients 
We calculated the probability that a patient would come for his or her 
first visit and for follow-up visits for each illness based on sex and age from 
the Patient Survey 1996 (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1997b).  We then 
generated a random number every other day starting from January 1, and 
calculated the probability of a sick person going for a checkup. Once the 
date for the first checkup is fixed, the date for the follow-up visit and the 
span of the treatment is determined by a stochastic proce~s.~  By repeating 
this process every day for one year,'O we were able to determine whether a 
member of a simulated household would visit a particular medical institu- 
tion for a checkup and determine the beginning and end date of treatment 
in addition to the frequency of the treatment." 
Estimating the Number of Inpatients 
The simulation of hospital care was conducted in the following manner. 
From the Patient Survey 1996 we estimated the daily probability of a new 
patient being admitted to a hospital or clinics based on sex and age group. 
For the number of days hospitalized, we estimated a single Weibull survival 
function, using the same survey and sex, age-group, and disease dummies 
9. The number offirst outpatient visits and return visits for each sex and age group was cal- 
culated from the Patient Survey 1996 (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1997b). We also ex- 
tracted total population data for sex and age groups from the national census of 1995. For a 
given sex and age group, the probability ofan outpatient visit is the sum ofthe  first-visit prob- 
ability and the return-visit probability. 
10.240  days will be regarded as one year. 
11. Some simulated individuals never visit a hospital in a given year. 110  Seiritsu Ogura, Tamotsu Kadoda, and Makoto Kawamura 
(table 4.5). We  used the estimated distribution function in our stochastic 
decision making. 
The date of hospitalization for each household member was determined 
in the same way as the date of outpatient checkup. We drew a random num- 
ber every other day starting from January 1 for each member of a household 
and determined if he or she is to be hospitalized on that day, given his or her 
age group. Once admitted, we draw another random number to determine 
if he or she is discharged on that day, based on the estimated Weibull distri- 
bution. By continuing this process until December 31, we were able to de- 
termine when each household member was in or out of the hospital. 
The Distribution of Medical Costs Based on the Survey of Medical Care 
Activities in Public Health Insurance (SMCA) 
Because there are no medical costs data in our Patient Survey 1996 we 
have to gather medical cost information from the Survey of Medical Care 
Activities in Public Health Insurance (SMCA; Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1997c).12  While the latter survey provides information on disease 
groups, type of hospitals, and the patient’s sex and age, it does not provide 
any information on his or her household characteristics. Here we assume 
that the medical cost per day is a random variable that follows the empiri- 
cal distribution of SMCA medical costs for a given patient and hospital at- 
tributes in the SMCA. In order to improve the concordance between the 
simulation results and aggregated medical costs, small adjustments were 
made  to the  empirical  SMCA distributions to remove the  bias in  its 
 sample^.'^ A random number was generated for every practicing day, and 
the medical expenditure for each household member was obtained. 
Repeating the process for all members of the standard households, we 
obtained the number of inpatient and outpatient visits and the total costs 
of outpatient care and of inpatient care for the year, as well as the annual 
insurance premium borne by households. 
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